Review of Lara Ostaric ed. Critical Essays is the first English-language collection of papers devoted to the philosophy of F. Schelling is timely, yet overdue. Renewed Anglophone interest in German idealism has been in full swing since the turn of the century, exposing scholars and students to the continuing relevance of the problems tackled and solutions offered during the tract of time stretching von Kant bis Hegel.
Kenneth R Westphal 3 Kenneth R.
SUNY Press,76— Because there are diverse and controver- sial views on this issue, how can basic criteria of justification be established with- out infinite regress, vicious circularity, or question-begging assumptions?
Particularists believe they have various particular instances of knowledge, on the basis of which they can construct a general account of the nature and criteria of knowledge.
Methodists believe they know the nature and criteria of knowledge, and on that basis can distinguish genuine from illegitimate particular instances of knowledge. Skeptics believe that no particular cases of knowledge can be identified without knowing the nature or criteria of knowledge, and that the nature or criteria of knowledge cannot be known without identifying particular cases of genuine knowl- edge.
Moser apparently discounts this problem because of his staunch justificatory internalism, which permits him to consider propositions as justified for particular persons, even if their principles of justification are not truth-conducive.
As his recent work reveals, this is much more a captilation to, rather than a solution of, serious skeptical challenges to knowledge and to our understanding of it. These projects must avoid the dilemma of being either naive or viciously circular. Having once argued that epistemic circularity need not be vicious, William Alston soon had second thoughts.
In other words, if and only if sense perception is reliable we can show it to be reliable. And how can we cancel out that if? Here is another way of posing the problem. If we are entitled to use belief from a certain source in showing that source to be reliable, then any source can be shown to be reliable.
For if all else fails, we can simply use each belief twice over, once as testee and once as tester. Thus if we allow the use of mode of belief formation M to determine whether the beliefs formed by M are true, M is sure to get a clean bill of health.
But a line of argument that will validate any mode of belief formation, no matter how irresponsible, is not what we are looking for.
We want, and need, something much more discriminating. Hence the fact that the reliability of sense perception can be established by relying on sense perception does not solve our problem.
It counts in favor of a practice if it is more firmly established. This involves a practice being more widely accepted, more definitely structured, more important to guiding action, more difficult to abstain from, more innately based, or having principles that seem more obviously true.
Al- ston adopts a negative coherentism: The more such self-support a doxastic practice generates, the more that counts in its favor. Analyzing doxastic practices in light of these criteria may help establish a rank ordering to which to appeal when massive conflicts arise among or within them.
What I have tried to show, using a number of exemplary cases, is that Pyrrhonian skepticism, when taken seriously and made a party to the debate, is much more intractable than those who have produced theories of empirical justification have generally supposed.
As far as I can see, the challenge of Pyrrhonian skepticism, once accepted, is unanswerable.
Unlike Fogelin I believe that our epistemological situa- tion is good, not dire. The surprise is that the proper response to Sextus comes from a philosopher who is widely supposed to have had no theory of knowledge at all: Hegel is an enormously sophisticated epistemologist whose views have gone unrecognized because his problems have gone unrecognized.
In one way or another, the solutions posed in the literature require that we be self-critical in order, e. Hegel recognized this problem and developed a very sophisticated and powerful analysis of it. Can we distinguish more from less credible basic assumptions?
There is a conceptual distinction be- tween evidence one has and evidence one accepts. In particular cases of knowledge or belief, as well as in particular epistemic analyses, there may be a significant divergence between the evidence someone has and the evidence he or she accepts.
This contrast reflects the fact that there is a conceptual distinction between appar- ent evidence and genuine evidence, and that in any particular case there may again be a significant divergence between them.
These two distinctions are themselves distinct, and part of our challenge, both as cognizant agents and as epistemologists, is to align them, both in principle and in practice. With these points in view, both the importance of and the difficulties involved in self-criticism can be suggested more clearly.
Can they be assessed without begging the question?That postmodernism is indefinable is a truism. However, it can be described as a set of critical, strategic and rhetorical practices employing concepts such as difference, repetition, the trace, the simulacrum, and hyperreality to destabilize other concepts such as presence, identity, historical progress, epistemic certainty, and the univocity of .
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In philosophy, idealism is the group of metaphysical philosophies that assert that reality, or reality as humans can know it, is fundamentally mental, mentally constructed, or otherwise immaterial. Epistemologically, idealism manifests as a skepticism about the possibility of knowing any mind-independent thing.
In contrast to materialism, idealism . This is a collection of four essays on aesthetic, ethical, and political issues by Dieter Henrich, the preeminent Kant scholar in Germany today. Although his interests have ranged widely, he is perhaps best known for rekindling interest in the great classical German tradition from Kant to Hegel.
Between Hegel And Spinoza: A Volume Of Critical Essays (bloomsbury Studies In Philosophy) by Hasana Sharp / / English / PDF. while Spinoza is the thinker of "pure affirmation".
Yet, between Hegel and Spinoza there is not only opposition. This collection of essays seeks Hegel and Spinoza there is not only opposition. This collection of. The collection combines close analysis with wide-ranging coverage of the text, and also traces connections with debates extending beyond Hegel scholarship, including issues in the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, ethics, and philosophy of religion.